Ontario electoral reform

Here’s an article I’ve written regarding proportional representation in New Zealand. The Kiwis use a voting system that shares many similarities with what is proposed for Ontario. It’s called a Mixed Member Proportional system (MMP).

If you’re an Ontario voter and you’ve actually heard of MMP, then that probably means you’re a geek like me who’s interested in electoral reform. My guess is that the vast majority of Ontario voters don’t know about MMP, or know that they’ll have the chance to answer a referendum question concerning MMP come Oct. 10.

I thought the province would have rolled out its ‘neutral’ information campaign -- an impossibility, no? -- on the referendum by now. I’ve seen between zero and very few television or print ads on the referendum. And none of the ads have actually delved into any MMP details. Is any one else concerned?

Anyway, here’s the article. Full disclosure: I will be voting in favour of MMP come the tenth. Why? I’ll get to that soon in another post. Warning: it's a long article.


As Ontarians begin to debate the merits of overhauling their electoral system, they would be wise to look to New Zealand, the South Pacific island nation of 4.1 million people that adopted a new electoral regimen just over a decade ago.

Since 1996 the Kiwis have been electing their politicians at the national level via the mixed-member proportional system (MMP), the same system that Ontarians will get to endorse or reject when they head to the polls during October’s provincial election.

There are some differences between the MMP system proposed for Ontario by the Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform and the system currently employed in New Zealand. By and large, similarities are more numerous than differences. New Zealand’s experience can inform Ontarians of some of the realities of MMP:
-Improved voter turnout, a common justification offered by MMP supporters, is not guaranteed
-New parties will spring up and earn representation in the legislature, drawing away some support from the traditional parties
-The time period after elections will be just as tension-filled as during campaigns, as the party with the greatest number of seats will need to negotiate privately with various small parties in an effort to form a stable government
-Leaders of small parties will secure powerful positions within the government that don’t necessarily correspond to their level of popular support
-Should Ontario voters ultimately endorse MMP, debate over its benefits will continue for years afterwards

A HISTORY OF DISTORTION

The clamour for electoral reform in New Zealand gained strength in the early 1980s. The country’s centre-left Labour Party had twice failed to capture the reigns of power—in the 1978 and 1981 elections—despite collecting the most votes. How could this happen? The vagaries of the country’s first-past-the-post (FPP) system were to blame.

Of course, this is the same system used in all Canadian provinces and at the federal level. Under FPP, parties that pull in less than 50 per cent of the electorate’s votes can be rewarded with inflated majorities. The Ontario Liberals, for instance, captured 69.9 per cent of the legislature’s seats during the 2003 election after having only garnered 46.5 per cent of the popular vote.

Ontario Progressive Conservatives and New Democrats collected far fewer seats in 2003 than they would have under an MMP system. New Zealand’s Social Credit Party, the country’s third party between the 1950s and 1980s, fared even worse. The electorate in 1981 gave the party 21 per cent of the vote, but this translated into just two seats in the 92-seat legislature.

With such erratic and unrepresentative results, it is hardly surprising that New Zealanders began to question the viability of their electoral system. Labour, twice burned by FPP, pledged to publicly examine the system if elected. The party followed through on its promise by establishing a Royal Commission on the Electoral System after winning power in 1984.

Reporting its findings at the close of 1986, the commission proposed New Zealand adopt a German-style MMP system. Both Labour and the centre-right National Party of New Zealand promised to hold a binding referendum on electoral reform, though neither party wanted to scrap FPP.

The subsequent referendum had two stages: voters were asked in September 1992 if they indeed wanted electoral reform, and if so, which alternative system they preferred. Turnout was low, with only 55 per cent of eligible voters registering their opinions. However, those who did take the time to vote chose change. Mixed-member proportional was by far the most popular alternative, finishing ahead of the Single Transferable Vote model.

The second stage of the binding referendum was held in November 1993 in conjunction with the national election. Voters were asked to choose between keeping the status quo FPP or adopting MMP (just as Ontarians will be asked in October). The Kiwis desired reform, though by no means did the vote overwhelmingly favour MMP. Fifty-four per cent backed it, a number that was lower than expected heading into the polls.

By comparison, a super, double majority will be needed in Ontario. That means at least 60 per cent of voters will have to approve MMP. Also, a simple majority of voters in 60 per cent of the province’s ridings is required. Without both criteria being met, MMP will not be implemented.

POLITICS TRANSFORMED

New Zealanders have been living with MMP for just over 10 years, or four elections, with the first MMP election held in October 1996. National elections are held every three years, just as they had been previously under the country’s old FPP system.

In that time, New Zealand’s political landscape has changed appreciably. While in 1993 there were four parties represented in parliament, today there are eight, though the two mainstream parties, Labour and National, still attract a vast majority of the popular vote (80 per cent between them in the 2005 election). Parties that have gained representation include the Green Party, the indigenous Maori Party, and others.

Some prominent members of parliament, such as Winston Peters, have broken ties with their former parties to chart new courses. Peters, for instance, quit National and formed the New Zealand First Party in 1994.

The threshold for a party to earn representation in parliament is higher in New Zealand than that proposed for Ontario (five per cent in New Zealand compared to Ontario’s three per cent). However, New Zealand has a rule that effectively undermines the purpose of the threshold: parties that elect a candidate in a riding but do not meet the threshold are still entitled to the number of seats reflected in their share of the popular vote.

For instance, Party X wins one riding and 4.5 per cent of the popular vote. Party X would then be allocated enough list seats to represent its 4.5 per cent share of the vote. In New Zealand’s 121-member legislature, this means that Party X would hold roughly five seats in total. Currently, two parties in New Zealand benefit from this stipulation.

Ontario’s MMP wouldn’t include the one-riding rule. Party X in Ontario could win and hold an individual riding, but if Party X doesn’t meet the three per cent threshold it would not receive any additional seats. This is an important point because in a tight, competitive election, just a few seats can make the difference between being in or out of the ruling coalition.

Proponents of proportional systems often tout them as remedies to low voter turnout and under-representation of women in parliament. Indeed, with MMP, the number of women in New Zealand’s legislature has jumped.

During the three parliaments before MMP’s inception, women on average comprised 17 per cent of the legislature. In the first three MMP parliaments, they averaged nearly 30 per cent of members. Such a notable increase is not attributable simply to more enlightened ideals on the part of Kiwis.

Voter turnout, unlike female representation, has declined. In the four elections preceding MMP, average turnout was an admirable 88 per cent. That has fallen to an average of 83 per cent since 1996—still considerably higher than Ontario’s 61 per cent average turnout since 1990. Perhaps it would be unrealistic to expect New Zealand’s voter participation to increase given its already high level. Conversely, it is difficult to imagine that Ontario (non)voters can become any more apathetic.

Stability is a word often invoked to champion the first-past-the-post system. Proportional systems such as MMP, critics argue, invariably lead to unwieldy coalition governments that are held captive by the interests of small parties. On the other hand, majority governments under FPP allow the ruling party to govern in a more disinterested fashion, and their stability fosters confidence among economic figures, proponents argue.

Mixed-member proportional, though, has not brought about a sudden decline in New Zealand’s economy or led to scandal-plagued government. Rather, the country enjoys low unemployment near the four per cent mark, runs budget surpluses, and experiences sound rates of growth in its gross domestic product.

It can’t be denied, however, that forming workable governments in New Zealand takes more time now than in the days of FPP. After the inaugural MMP election in 1996 it took nearly two months to sort out—through behind-the-scenes negotiations—which parties would support National.

Finally, it was announced that National and New Zealand First would form the government, though this arrangement only lasted until 1998, after which point National ruled as a minority government (not unlike Canada’s last two federal parliaments). Labour subsequently swept National out of office in 1999, under the leadership of Helen Clark, and it has ruled since then with various coalition partners.

Though New Zealand’s political parties have grown accustomed to MMP, it still takes time to form governments after elections. In 2005, for instance, a month passed before Labour announced it had forged a firm coalition.

Why does it take this long if probable coalitions are known before the election ends? In New Zealand, this isn’t always the case. Expected coalitions don’t necessarily materialize, causing understandable frustration for voters.

In 1996, NZ First wouldn’t indicate publicly whether it would support Labour or National, though NZ First leader Peters did suggest that he would spurn National if it won. National did win and Peters surprised many by agreeing to a coalition and assuming the post of deputy prime minister.

Peters, often criticized for his anti-immigrant policy, has been the foreign affairs minister in the Labour-led government since 2005. Before the election he pledged that his party—which collected 5.7 per cent of the popular vote and seven seats—would refuse a coalition with either Labour or National.

As recently as November 2004, Peters had described Labour as "a party of gender-bending control freaks. They have a deep-rooted authoritarian ‘we know best’ streak that New Zealanders view with distrust." Nonetheless, Peters was content to sign up as Clark’s foreign minister. Though such political maneuvering isn’t necessarily inherent to MMP, it does provide fodder for the system’s opponents.

REVISITING MMP

When New Zealanders chose MMP back in 1993, the situation could hardly be described as a love-in. The Kiwis were fairly divided, as 46 per cent desired the status quo. This divide has never disappeared—Peters’ antics don’t help—and New Zealanders continue to analyze the inner-workings of their electoral system.

National, which only narrowly lost the 2005 election to Labour, had promised during the campaign that it would hold a binding referendum on MMP if elected. And more than one political pundit has said it’s time, a decade on, to ask the people if they still prefer MMP.

However, the electoral law in New Zealand that guided MMP’s implementation never mandated a referendum, though many Kiwis were under the opposite impression at the time. Instead, the law called for a review by a parliamentary committee.

With the experience of two MMP elections to draw upon—1996 and 1999—the committee issued a report in 2001 that was anything but conclusive. The multiple parliamentary parties that took part in the committee’s work failed to come to a consensus on most issues. Should MMP be discarded? Should it go to a binding referendum, especially considering three-quarters of the electorate desired it so? The committee didn’t say. Certainly, the lively debate will continue in the years ahead.

It is a historic decision for a society to change the way it distributes power to its elected representatives. Come October, Ontarians will be asked if they want to retire the electoral system they have used for more than two centuries.

New Zealand’s experience offers hindsight to Ontarians before they make a decision. Certainly, there are important differences between MMP in New Zealand and what has been proposed by the Citizens’ Assembly. In the end, it will be up to each and every voter to weigh the pros and the cons of change.